ET MALWARE Observed Malicious SSL Cert (Zepakab CnC)

SID: 2026864Rev: 30 views
History
Sourceet/open
CreatedJanuary 31, 2019
UpdatedSeptember 16, 2020
Classificationdomain-c2
alert tls $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"ET MALWARE Observed Malicious SSL Cert (Zepakab CnC)"; flow:from_server,established; tls.cert_subject; content:"CN=Seven DSert SHA2 CA"; nocase; endswith; tls.cert_issuer; content:"C=US, ST=Some-State, O=Seven Ltd, CN=Seven DSert SHA2 CA"; reference:url,blog.yoroi.company/research/sofacys-zepakab-downloader-spotted-in-the-wild/; classtype:domain-c2; sid:2026864; rev:3; metadata:affected_product Windows_XP_Vista_7_8_10_Server_32_64_Bit, attack_target Client_and_Server, created_at 2019_01_31, deployment Perimeter, malware_family Zekapab, malware_family Zepakab, performance_impact Low, confidence High, signature_severity Major, tag SSL_Malicious_Cert, tag APT, tag Description_Generated_By_Proofpoint_Nexus, updated_at 2020_09_16, mitre_tactic_id TA0011, mitre_tactic_name Command_And_Control, mitre_technique_id T1071, mitre_technique_name Application_Layer_Protocol;)

Metadata

affected productWindows_XP_Vista_7_8_10_Server_32_64_Bit
attack targetClient_and_Server
created at2019_01_31
deploymentPerimeter
malware familyZepakab
performance impactLow
confidenceHigh
signature severityMajor
tagDescription_Generated_By_Proofpoint_Nexus
updated at2020_09_16
mitre tactic idTA0011
mitre tactic nameCommand_And_Control
mitre technique idT1071
mitre technique nameApplication_Layer_Protocol

Comments (0)

Please sign in to leave a comment.
Sign in

No comments yet. Be the first to comment!